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Lipsig: Equal Pay

EQUAL PAY FOR
COMPARABLE
WORTH
Jolie Lipsig*

Wage discrimination against women is prohibited by both
the Equal Pay Act1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 While
Title VII contains a broad prohibition against any form of employment discrimination, the Equal Pay Act specifically addresses the problem of unequal wages between men and women
workers. The Equal Pay Act requires that men and women who
perform "substantially equal" work receive equal compensation
but does not apply when men and women are segregated in the
. workplace and, therefore, perform different jobs.3
*

Second Year Student, Golden Gate School of Law.

1. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1) (Supp. IT 1978) provides:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in
which such employees are -employed, between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. IT 1978) states in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em- .
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportqnities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (Supp. IT 1978).
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Because application of the Equal Pay Act is limited by the
"substantially equal" requirement, women seek relief for wage
discrimination under Title VII using a theory of comparable'
worth, also known as comparable work or comparable value theory.4 Comparable worth is based on the premise that all employees who perform work of equal value to their employers should
be paid equal wages.1\
Several recent wage discrimination cases have been brought
under a theory of comparable worth, with the plaintiffs charging
violations of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.s The circuit
courts that have heard these cases reached differing conclusions
on the proper relationship between the two Acts and on the viability of a comparable worth standard.'1 The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in one such case, Gunther v. County of Washington, 8 and will decide whether the standards required by the
Equal Pay Act are also required in wage discrimination suits
under Title VII. Although conclusions are grounded in statutory
interpretation and legislative history, the courts ultimately balance the economic effects on the employer and labor market
against the economic rights of women.9
4. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 244
(l.'980) (city-employed nurses sued their employer for violating Title VII by paying them
low wages that reflected the community wage scale); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353
(8th Cir. 1977) (university clerical workers charged they were paid less than physical
plant workers for work of equal value to their employer and that this discriminated
against them as women); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980)
(female factory workers claimed their employer used discriminatory job evaluations to
determine wages and job levels, resulting in low salaries for jobs filled by women); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d
1303 (1980), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). See note 212 infra.
5. Employers use several methods of job evaluation to determine wages and the relative values of jobs. See notes 196-209 infra and accompanying text.
6. See cases cited note 4 supra.
7. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits refuse to recognize a theory of comparable
worth, while the Third and Ninth Circuits have upheld the validity of a limited comparable worth theory.
8. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981).
9. See cases cited note 4 supra. See also Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975) (female head of department unsuccessfully
claimed wage discrimination based on fact that some male department heads earned
more than plaintiff); Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff, an employee at the Apollo test site, failed to establish that her denial of test site clearance,
which was granted to male employees, would have entitled her to higher pay, and that
she was performing work equal to higher paid males).
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This Comment will briefly trace the history of job segregation from colonial America to the present, and explore the relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII in light of the
controversial Bennett Amendment. Io The interpretation of this
Amendment, which limits the effect of the Equal Pay Act on
Title VII, has lead to arguments both for and against adoption
of a comparable worth standard by the courts. A comparison of
opinions of the various courts concerning the amendment will
follow, focusing on the emerging theory of equal pay for comparable worth. A discussion of different job evaluation techniques
and suggestions on how to use these evaluations as proof of discrimination is included.
I. WOMEN'S WORK-PAST AND PRESENT
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF JOB SEGREGATION

Traditionally, work done by women in America served a vital function in the growth and maintenance of society. While
women perform important jobs, their work is undervalued by
employers because it is weighed on a scale in which "male"
traits, such as physical strength and aggression, rate high. Because the job market is segregated by gender, the low value assigned "women's work" is reflected in low salaries, whether the
work is exactly the same as work done by men or merely worth
the same to their employerP
In colonial America women produced all essential manufactured goods. They bore the responsibility of manufacturing because they were considered unfit for heavy manual labor and,
therefore, remained at home while men worked in the fields. 12
Because the colonists strove to develop a strong agrarian economy, agricultural work received a higher societal value than the
supplying of domestic necessities. Is After the American Revolu10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1978). See notes 106-141 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 43-47 infra and accompanying text.
12. Blau, The Data on Women Workers, Past, Present, and Future, in WOMEN
WORKING-THEORIES AND FACTS IN PERSPECTIVE 30 (A. Stromberg & S. Harkess eds.
1978). Colonial women manufactured essentials such as soap, cloth, candles, and lace.
Pilgrims made these goods because they no longer had ready access to products available
in England. [d. at 32.
13. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 48-49 (1965). The
colonists' emphasis on agriculture was based in part on England's control. England
wanted the colonies to provide her with sorely needed produce, and, in turn, wanted a
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tion, women continued to perform primarily domestic functions,!· although some women did work outside the home as
school teachers, midwives, and nurses. IG
Segregation of women into lower paying occupations intensified with the Industrial Revolution in the mid-nineteenth century, as women became a major force in the growing textile industry.ls The proliferation of textile factories allowed women to
supplement farm income with part-time work away from home. I"
Although employed outside of the house, a woman working at
the mill did the same job she had done at home;18 thus, factory
work provided her with no new skills.
With industrialization, growing numbers of families abandoned farming altogether and moved into urban areas.19 Some
women were forced to stay at home to care for children who
were no longer occupied with farm chores; others continued to
captive market for her own manufactured goods. Thus, agriculture became the only major profitable industry. The manufacture of goods, while essential in lowering the volume
of English imports, was not essential to the colonial economy directly. ld.
14. E. DEXTER, CAREER WOMEN OF AMERICA: 1776-1840, at 224 (1950). Dexter suggests that women generally had more freedom before the Revolution than after:
It appears . . . women were accorded somewhat less freedom
after the Revolution, [which was] dedicated to the ideal that
all men were 'created equal, than they had enjoyed before it
. . • [I]n pioneer days there were few codes, legal or traditional: matters were dealt with as they came up, according to
the English Common Law [which was] adapted to fit new conditions. The Revolution was followed by a mania for codifying,
all done of course by men. Apparently they were not ready to .
accept formally some conditions they had tacitly permitted,
and so perhaps unconsciously, they curtailed the existing priv.
ileges of women.
ld. at 223-24.
15. ld. at 29. Women taught boys and girls through age 10, and young women. The
more important task of educating young men was left to,the male school master. ld. at 2.
16. Women's dominant role. in the textile industry began with women working at
home, spinning wool into yarn to meet family needs, and selling the surplus to weavers.
Blau, supra note 12, at 31. In 1850 there were over 12,000 cotton factories and over 1,500
woolen mills in the United States. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483.
17. Kulm, An Economist's View of Woman's Work, in CORPORATE LIB: WOMEN'S
CHALLENGE TO THE MANAGEMENT 64 (E. Ginzberg & A. Yohalem eds. 1973).
18. Blau, supra note 12, at 31.
19. In the 1840's, the population of towns and cities with over 8,000 inhabitants
increased by 90%. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483.
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work at the mills.20 Young, single women, eager to escape the
drudgery of rural life, comprised another growing section of the
work force. 21 The shift from an agrarian to an industrial society
affected a marked change on the role of women. On the farm,
women's work, while undervalued, had been an integral part of
rural life and survival. In the cities, however, there was no
equally significant work for women. 22 Although textile mills, and
later garment factories, continued to employ women into the
twentieth century, few other industries were open to women.
The influx of immigrants to the growing labor market during
this period intensified the exclusion of women from occupations
in new industries.23
The participation of the United States in World War I
forced women into occupations that would have otherwise been
unavailable to them. 24 Despite the success of the suffrage movement in 1919, by 1920 women had returned to traditional employment to make way for the returning troops.215 Nevertheless,
during the first two decades of the twentieth century women
dominated certain rapidly growing fields, particularly clerical
work and retail sales.26
During the Great Depression both women and men were
among the unemployed; increasing numbers of women found it
necessary to seek employment to supplement their husbands' in20. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 64.
21. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483.
22. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 64.
23. The number of people immigrating to America increased from 300,000 in 1866 to
789,000 in 1802. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 768. Employers preferred hiring male
immigrants because men were viewed as the traditional breadwinners, Blau, supra note
12, at 33; and also because women generally worked only until marriage. S. MORISON,
supra note 13, at 483.
. 24. Women replaced male workers in iron and steel mills, as drivers for public transportation, elevator operators, and bricklayers. They also gained prominent positions in
the professions-notably as lawyers and doctors. W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER
CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, at 51 (1972).
25. Women were fired or forced out of their newly acquired positions when the war
ended. Some male workers even went on strike to force women out of jobs. Twenty women appointed to the bench in New York State during the war were forced to resign
immediately after the Armistice because their appointments had been only "emergency
provisions." [d. at 53.
26. "Almost one million women joined the clerical work force during the decade beginning in 1910 and the proportion of female employees holding clerical and sales jobs
jumped from 17 per cent in 1910 to 30 per cent in 1930." [d. at 55.
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comes or to support their families. Throughout this period women were primarily employed in low-level white-collar and service-oriented occupations. 27 These jobs paid lower wages than
blue-collar jobs, which, with the exception of those in the textile
industry, remained unavailable to women. 28 Employers justified
underpaying women becaus~ of the common notion that women
worked only to earn "pin money" and, therefore, shouldn't be
allowed to take jobs from unemployed men, or men who worked
at lower paying jobs. 29
World War II created even larger changes in the female labor market than the previous war. The government, as well as
private industry, realized the potential of solving the "manpower
crisis" with womanpower. 80 Women not only found satisfaction
doing "non-traditional" work in the munitions factories and the
transportation and construction industries, but also found substantially higher salaries than offered before. 81 Women proved
27. The 1930 census indicated that 30% of all working women worked in domestic
and service fields, 19% as clerical workers, 17% in manufacturing, 14% were classified as
professionals, 9% worked as skilled tradespersons, 9% in agriculture, and only 3%
worked in transportation and communications. WOMEN WORKERS THROUGH THE DEPRESSION, THE AMERICAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION 51-52 (L. Pruette & I. Peters eds. 1934). The
American Women's Association, which conducted an early survey of working women,
gives a possible reason for the lack of women in trades: "The appeal of certain professions and of many clerical positions is derived from the pleasanter conditions of work as
from other aspects. Many women will prefer a lower income and agreeable and dignified
surroundings to the higher income under more distasteful conditions." [d. at 53. Presumably, "distasteful conditions" included the hostility of male co-workers, as well as inadequate health and safety provisions.
28. Female workers in all categories were underpaid. Women doing traditional women's work in garment factories and offices received notoriously low pay, while women
doing the same jobs as men were paid less than men. In manufacturing, women received
50-60% of what men earned. In 1937 women workers took home an average of $525 a
year, compared to $1,027 a year for men. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 51.
29. The pin-money hypothesis assumed that women workers were well-supported
and sought a paying job only as a means of securing extra cash to indulge frivolous feminine desires. The theory followed women workers wherever they went and, by implication, justified the inequality from which they suffered. If females were subsidized by
their families, there was no compelling reason to treat them the same as men. Employers
could rationalize paying women low wages on the ground that they did not need their
earnings to live on, and public officials could dismiss women workers as casual members
of the labor force who had no serious grievances. [d. at 53.
30. "By April 1942 the proportion of women receiving government-sponsored vocational training had leaped from 1 per cent to 13 per cent. And within seven months the
number of jobs for which employers were willing to consider female applicants had
climbed from 29 per cent to 55 per cent." [d. at 137.
31. Thelma Carthen, who quit her job at Woolworths to become a welder in 1943
Women's Law Forum
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they could 'do a man's job, and do it well. 32
Although many women lost their jobs after the war, others
remained active members of the work force. Large numbers of
women found respectable work, in other words, low-level whitecollar jobs,33 after the war, thus compounding what would come
to be known as the secretarial "ghetto." Nevertheless, despite
the increasing number of working women, economic inequality
prevailed. In 1951, all industries in which women constituted
more than fifty percent of the work force paid wages below the
national average. 3~
B.

WOMEN'S ROLE TODAY

In the 1960's, women's fight for economic and social equality accelerated. Yet, even today, while more women are working
than ever before, and those performing nontraditional jobs receive media attention,315 economic discrimination against women
remains largely unaffected.

Statistics from 1960 to 1980 show that women continue to
:fill predominantly secretarial positions in the white-collar sector.3S Women made their largest gains during this period within
the professions,37 while their participation in blue-collar jobs dispoke of her work: "Actually, I like welding. There is no comparison to shipyard welding
and assembly line, because I'll have a different job every day. . . I get sort of wound up
in my work. I'm interested in how much I can do." CONVERSATIONS: WORKING WOMEN
TALK ABOUT DOING A "MAN's JOB" 51 (T. Wetherby ed. 1977). Wages for workers making
war materiel were 40% higher than wages in consumer factories. Commonly, women were
able to double their salaries by leaving jobs as waitresses, secretaries, and laundresses for
employment in the war industries. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 144.
32. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 39.
33. Women with training in new fields were able to secure industrial positions. In
1946 women made up 40% of operatives in consumer industry and 13% in heavy industry. The number of clerical workers increased by 100%, and generally, more women were
working than ever before. ld. at 181-82.
34. ld. at 185 (citing WOMEN'S BUREAU, EQUAL PAY INDICATORS, (1952».
35. While the phrase "nontraditional job" brings to mind truck drivers, carpenters,
and the like, statistics reveal executives, doctors, and professors may also belong in this
category. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text.
36. 1 EEOC EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1971, JOB PATl'ERNS FOR
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY xxxxii (1972). In 1966, 56.9% of all working women were in white collar jobs; by 1971, that figure rose to 61.6%. A breakdown of
the particular positions held by white collar women shows that, in 1966, 38.4% of all
working women did office or clerical work, while only 2.4% were officials and managers
and 2.9% were professionals. ld.
37. In 1971, 6.6% of all working women were professionals-an increase of 3.7%
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minished between 1966 and 1971.38 Within the blue-collar field,
women were employed mostly as unskilled factory operatives.39
Today, in 1981, little has changed. While more women hold
managerial positions, fewer work in skilled high-paying blue-collar jobs; their economic status in the work force remains the
same!O
Although attitudes towards women working in "nontraditional jobs have changed somewhat, certain jobs remain linked
to gender.·1 Prevailing attitudes are expressed by the treatment
of women in educational and vocational institutions. School
counselors, teachers, and parents often encourage young women
to develop only those skills necessary to perform traditional women's work. Thus, a woman with the educational equivalent of a
man lacks the experience or training required for a particular
job, and the man will be hired!2
Job segregation, or "balkanization,"43 fosters severe wage
discrimination. Nearly all fields dominated by women yield
lower salaries than those dominated by men!· Somewhat ironifrom 1966. [d.
38. The percentage of women blue collar workers decreased from 32% to 28.6% in
1971. [d.
39. In 1971, 19% of all women were factory operatives, compared to 2.5% working
as skilled craft workers and 7% working as laborers. [d.
40. Statistics for May 1980 8how that 66% of all working women are white collar
workers. Within the white collar field, however, only 7% hold management positions,
and 35% are clerical workers. Only 14% of all women are blue collar workers. DEP'T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 35 (1980).
Generalized statistics are often misleading. "An increase in the number of women
white collar workers may look promising, but women are invariably concentrated in the
lower paying secretarial jobs. As of June 1980, the total clerical work force was 76.19%
female, while men made up 83.6% of the blue collar field. Within the white collar field,
however, women constituted 71.4% of all nonprofessional health workers, 70% of all
school teachers, and 53% of all service workers. In the blue collar field, 95% of all craft
and kindred workers were male, as were 98% of all mechanics. [d.
41. Our language reflects these attitudes as well. "Secretary, for example, denotes
not just job skills but female gender; nuraing is 80 sex-typed that one must make explicit
the exception by specifying 'male nurae.' " J. KREPs, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE, AMERICAN
WOMEN AT WORK 35 (1971).
42. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.
BULL., THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 3-4 (1976).
43. "Balkanization" refers to the division of a potentially strong unit, the workforce,
into the segregated, ineffectual categories of men's and women's jobs. Because women are
segregated, they can never gain the experience or education necessary to enter the male
workplace.
44. In 1974, the median weekly earnings for all managers and administrators (men
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cally, the growing female presence in the work force has made
the problem more acute. Balkanization has resulted in the overcrowding of the female job market; the number of women seeking work constantly expands while the number of jobs available
to them remains limited."5 With supply far exceeding demand,
employers need not pay women wages equal to those in male
dominated fields."6 They are assured of finding women to work
for whatever wages they care to offer. Because men need not
seek lower paying jobs, the competition for higher paying positions increases, compounding job segregation."7
II. FEDERAL LAW AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act"8 in 1963. In this attempt to end wage discrimination against women, Congress required that men and women be paid the same wages for performing the same jobs."9 One year later, Congress passed the
expansive Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 The Civil Rights Act generally prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, or
national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits discrimination in employment, including wage discrimination. 51 Considerable controversy exists over the relationship of
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act; litigants and the judiciary have
used both Acts to justify or invalidate a theory of equal pay for
comparable worth.
A.

THE EQUAL PAY ACT

The Equal Pay Act provides that an employer may not discriminate against employees on the basis of sex by paying differand women) was $250. In comparison, service workers earned a median $117. Craft workers received a median salary of $211 a week, while clerical workers received only $140. 1
EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1974 JOB PATTERNS FOR MINoRITIES
AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 28 (1975). In 1976 the median weekly earnings of all
full time women workers was $145; the median weekly earnings of all men was $234. U.S.
DEP'T OF LAB. BULL., WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 34 (1977).
45. Jobs available to women are dictated by many factors, including the attitudes
discussed above.
46. Bergman, Occupational Segregation; Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate by Race or Sex, 1 E. ECON. J. 103-10 (1975).
47. See note 44 supra.
48. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978).

49. [d.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978).

51. [d.
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ent wages to employees performing jobs which require equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions.1I2 Courts interpret the Act to allow
wage differentials between male and female workers unless the
jobs in question are "substantially equal."IIS
In an Equal Pay Act case, the employee has the burden of
proving coverage of the Act and must then show a prima facie
sex-based wage differential.M Four factors are used to determine
whether two jobs are equal for purposes of comparison under the
Act: skill, effort, responsibility, and similarity of working
conditions. 1I11

Skill may be both mental and physical;1I6 it includes education, experience, and training,II'1 provided the job actually requires the superior training or experience of the employee.liS
Similarly, effort is measured in terms of both physical and
mental exertion required by a job. The occasional requirement
of greater physical exertion will not constitute superior effort
52. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). For full text, see note 1 supra.
53. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Del. 1971), a!f'd in
part, rev'd on other grounds, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)
(wage differential between women employees in women's clothing department and male
employees in men's clothing department held justified). In Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977), in which female bench assemblers were unable to
prove they did work equal to that done by male heavy assemblers, the court said: "A
showing of comparability of positions is not sufficient to give rise to an inference that the
positions are equal." [d. at 1176.
54. See generally Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). For full text, see note 1 supra.
56. An example of comparable physical and mental skills is seen where two employees spend an equal amount of time at basic office work and the balance of their shifts at
different tasks, one at bookkeeping and the other at loading and unloading stock. The
physical skills required for lifting would be compared with the mental skills required by
the bookkeeping.
57. "Skill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education,
and ability. It must be measured in terms of the performance requirements of the job."
29 C.F.R•.§ 800.125 (1980).
58. "Possession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be
considered in making a determination regarding equality of skill." [d. See Peltier v. City
of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976) (duties of female and male police "car markers"
identical; fact that the males were trained police officers did not justify 50% wage differential because police skills were not used on the job); Bullock v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 424 (M.D. La. 1977) (a college education did not constitute superior skill of male
unit manager of pizza parlor since there was no showing that a college education was
required for performance of the job).
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under the Act; the extra effort must be both a substantial and
regular part of the employee's duties. Physical exertion must be
weighed equally with both types of effort required by the job.ISS
Job responsibility must also be equal. Responsibility is gauged
by the amount of supervision under which an employee works
and the amount of independent judgment and discretion an employee must use.60 The final factor used in determining equality
of jobs is whether the jobs are performed under similar working
conditions. Working conditions are determined by the job's surroundings and the hazards to which a worker is exposed.61 For
example, a shop employee works in different surroundings than
the employee who makes house calls and, therefore, may be subject to different degrees of pressure. Similarly, because of job
surroundings one employee may risk bodily harm, while another
employee doing the same job in a different location may not.62
These differences could warrant a wage differential.
Despite these somewhat expansive, flexible criteria, the
59.

[S]uppose that a male checker employed by a supermarket is
required to spend part of his time carrying out heavy packages
or replacing stock involving the lifting of heavy items whereas
a female checker is required to devote an equal degree of effort during a similar portion of her time to performing fill-in
work requiring greater dexterity-such as rearranging displays
of spices or other small items. The differentiation in kind of
effort required does not • • . justify a wage differential • • • •
Suppose, however, that men and women are working side by
side on a line assembling parts. Suppose further that one of
the men who performs the operations at the end of the line
must also lift the assembly, as he completes his part of it, and
place it on a waiting pallet. In such a situation, a wage differential might be justified for the person. • • who is required to
expend the extra effort in the performance of his job, provided
that the extra effort expended is substantial and is performed
over a considerable portion of the work cycle.
29 C.F.R. § 880.128 (1980).
60. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.129-.130 (1980). See Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F. Supp.
787 (D. Mass. 1967) (wage differential justified because men on night shift in tag room
worked under less supervision than women on day shift); Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F.
Supp. 561 (N.D. Fla. 1967) (difference in pay between male office manager and female
bookkeeper justified because office manager was responsible for handling and depositing
cash and needed to use personal judgment regarding expenditures).
61. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1977) (airline stewardesses found to be doing work under same conditions
as male pursers).
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.132 (1980). See also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188 (1974) (day shift versus night shift does not constitute different working
conditions).
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Equal Pay Act does not address the problem of job segregation,
nor does it provide a remedy for those women who are trapped
in low-paying, sex-segregated jobs. In a labor market segregated
by gender,68 men and women perform different jobs, yet wage
differentials between workers doing dissimilar work cannot be
compared under the Equal Pay Act.lU A wage differential between male "orderlies" and female "nurses aides" was justified
under the Equal Pay Act in Brennan v. Inglewood,6r> because the
orderlies were trained to use a catheter with male patients (a
more difficult operation than with female patients), and their
duties included waxing floors and some heavy lifting. While the
court found that the jobs in question were not substantially
equal, the district court never addressed the fundamental question of why females were given different tasks. Nor did the court
compare the difference in job requirements with the wage differential. Failure to address job segregation is a basic inadequacy in
Equal Pay Act cases. Because the courts never examine or attempt to eradicate the underlying discrimination, the Equal Pay
Act provides a superficial remedy applicable in only the most
blatant cases of wage discrimination.66
63. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
64.

[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to apply the equal
pay standard to jobs substantially differing in their terms and
conditions. Thus the question of whether a female bookkeeper
should be paid as much as a male file clerk required to perform a substantially different job is outside the purview of the
equal pay provisions • • . [T]he equal pay standard is not to
be applied where only men are employed in the establishment
in one job and only women are employed in dissimilar job. . •
the standard would not apply where only women are employed
in clerk typist positions and only men are employed in jobs as
administrative secretaries if the latter require substantially
different duties.

29 C.F.R. § 800.120 (1980).

See also Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 63 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 44,265 (E.D. Wis.
1970) (two women were denied coverage under the Equal Pay Act even though their jobs
had been assigned the same point value by the employer as jobs performed by male coworkers, because no males performed the same jobs).
65. 412 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Mo. 1975).
66. For further explanation of the Equal Pay Act, see Johnson, Equal Pay Act of
1963: A Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 570 (1975). For a detailed history, see
Elisburg, Equal Pay in the United States: The Development and Implementation of
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 LAB. L.J. 195 (1978).
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Defenses

The Equal Pay Act provides four affirmative defenses which
an employer charged with a violation may raise. 67 Once the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a sex-based wage differential between two substantially equal jobs, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove one or more of the defenses. The defenses
include a seniority system, a bona fide merit or evaluation system, quantity or quality of product, or any factor other than sex.
A seniority system which rewards employees with higher
wages according to their length of employment with the company is justified even though it may result in a wage differential
between employees performing equal work. 68 A merit or job evaluation system helps the employer rate jobs in order to determine
relative wages.69 If an employer can show a systematic, bona
fide, and not purely subjective evaluation method was used to
set the wages in question, the differential will survive scrutiny
under the Act.70 Differing quantity or quality of work may also
justify a difference in pay. If an employee sells more expensive
goods, for example, or produces a more valuable item than other
employees, an employer may pay that worker at a higher rate.71
The fourth defense, "any other factor other than sex," operates
as a broad and general exclusion. Because Congress felt it impossible to anticipate every potentially legitimate basis for a
wage differential, it provided this inclusive exception.72 To prove
67. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978) authorizes a wage differential if the employer
can show it is based on "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (iv) a differential based on
any other factor other than sex ••.•n
68. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Brennan v. Victoria Bank
& Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974) (seniority system was legitimate basis for wage
differentials between male and female bank tellers).
69. For a further discussion of job evaluation techniques, see notes 187-199 infra
and accompanying text.
70. See generally cases cited note 68 supra.
71. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 866 (1973) (pay differential between male and female sales persons justified because
men sold more expensive merchandise).
72.
[The fourth defense] recognizes certain circumstances such as
'red circle rates.' The term is borrowed from War Labor Board
parlance and describes certain unusual higher than normal
wage rates which are maintained for many valid reasons. For
instance, it is not uncommon for an employer who must reduce help in a skilled job to transfer employees to other less
demanding jobs but to continue to pay them a premium rate
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this exception applies, however, an employer may have to show
what specific factor other than sex was determinative, and that
the factor was accorded its proper weight in the determination
of wages.73

Remedies
A court may assess both civil and criminal penalties for an
Equal Pay Act violation. The standard remedy is an award of
back pay, the difference between the wages paid the employee
and what would have been paid absent the discrimination.7• In
addition, the employee is entitled to attorney's fees,715 as well as
liquidated damages,76 which are a fixed sum equal to the amount
of back pay already awarded. Liquidated damages may be reduced or eliminated, however, if the employer can show he or
she acted in good faith.77 Once liability is established, an employer may not lower rates for men, but must instead raise the
in order to have them available when they are again needed
for their former jobs.
H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 687, 689.
It is interesting to note that the House Report also mentions "shift differentials,
restrictions on or differences based on time of day worked, hours of work, lifting or moving of heavy objects" as things that they might consider as "factors other than sex." The
courts have held that none of the factors listed above justify wage differentials under the
Equal Pay Act.
73.
[I]f the difference in salaries paid is too great to be accounted
for by the difference [in the asserted factor other than sex],
then it would seem necessary to show some other factor other
than sex as the basis for the unexplained portion of the wage
differential before a conclusion that there is no wage discrimination based on sex would be warranted.
29 C.F.R. § 800.143 (1980).
74. "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this
[title] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation •..." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. II 1978).
75. Id. "The employee is entitled to 'an additional •• .' amount [equal to their back
pay] as liquidated damages." Id. This amounts to double damages.
76.Id.
77.
Liquidated Damages: In any action ... to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated
damag~s, under the [FLSA], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to
such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable
grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA], the court may, in its sound discretion,
award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof
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wages paid to women to an equal amount.'18 In addition to a civil
suit, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
may bring a criminal action against willful violators and may file
for a preliminary injunction in district court to prevent continuing violations.'19
B.

TITLE

VII

While most wage discrimination cases have been brought
under the Equal Pay Act, a few plaintiffs have attempted to
prove a violation of Title VII as well.80 Title VII prohibits sex
discrimination by employers in matters concerning hiring and
firing, compensation, conditions or privileges of employment,
and in segregation or classification of employees or applicants.81
Title VII's application is broader than that of the Equal Pay
Act. While the Equal Pay Act requires equal skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working conditions,82 Title VII generally
prohibits all discrimination in compensation based on sex.8S As a
result, several plaintiffs have attempted to use Title VII to establish a theory of comparable worth by which they seek to attack wage discrimination. This theory would protect female employees not covered by the Equal Pay Act because their jobs are
not substantially equal to jobs done by men, yet who nonetheless suffer from sex-based wage discrimination.84
not to exceed the amount specified in section 216(b) of this
title.
29 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. II 1978).
78. "Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation
of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection,
reduce the wage rate of any employee." Id. § 206(d)(1).
79. "Willful violations of the Act may be prosecuted criminally." 29 C.F.R.
§ 800.166(c) (1980). "The [EEOC] may obtain a court injunction to restrain any person
from violating the law, including the unlawful withholding by an employer of proper
compensation." Id. § .166(b).
80. See cases cited notes 4 & 9 supra. The prison employees in Gunther brought
suit under Title VII because the Equal Pay Act did not apply to government employees
during the period in question. Although the court recognized the validitY of job comparisons in limited situations, appellants actually argued that their jobs were substantially
equal, as if proceeding under the Equal Pay Act, rather than under a theory of job comparability. Brief for Appellants at 22, Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 852
(9th Cir. 1979).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978). See note 2 supra, for full text.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978).
84. See generally cases cited note 4 supra.
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The requisite burden of proof in a Title VII suit depends on
the nature of the alleged violation. There are three basic types of
Title VII violations. A plaintiff may allege the employer engaged
in intentional discrimination, or, although not intentional, the
employer's action or inaction resulted in either disparate treatment of an individual, or in disparate impact on a class of
individuals.
Intentionally or facially discriminatory practices are prohibited by Title VII. After a showing of discriminatory intent is
made, the employer may attempt to raise the bona fide occupational qualification,811 the only defense to a charge of intentional
discrimination. This defense allows employers to give preferential treatment in employment or classification of an individual
based on gender "in instances where [gender] is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."88 The bona
fide occupational qualification has been narrowly construed by
the courts and per1l}.itted only where certain sexual characteristics are absolutely necessary.8'1 Because only intentionally discriminatory practices give rise to a bona fide occupational qualification, this defense has little relevance in comparable worth
cases, where wage inequality is generally the result of a subtle
evolution of job segregation.
85.

(e) Not withstanding any other provision of this subchapter:
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment
agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual ...
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978).
86. Id. For a detailed discussion of the BFOQ, see Comment, Title VII: Sex Discrimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona Fide?, 30 U.
FLA. L. REV. 466 (1978).
87. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (pregnant women may be excluded
from stewardess positions); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969) (strength requirements for "switchman" job did not constitute bona fide occupational qualification); Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Co. 444 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1971)
(heavy manual work required for trainyard worker not bona fide occupational qualification). In Rosenfield, the court suggested that only jobs such as actor and actress, model,
and wet nurse could satisfy the defense.
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A Title VII violation may also be found where an employer's
practices, while facially neutral, result in the discriminatory
treatment of an individual. The formula for proof in such a case,
as stated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green,88 puts the primary burden on the plaintiff to show prima
facie discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff's burden includes a
showing that plaintiff is a member of a group protected by Title
VII and that she was denied an opportunity granted to others
with equal qualifications. 89 Once a prima facie showing is made,
the burden shifts to the employer to show "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [treatment].90 The
plaintiff is then entitled to prove that the employer's ostensible
reason for the disparate treatment was merely a pretext for sex
discrimination. Because disparate treatment analysis applies
only to individuals, wage discrimination suits are rarely brought
under this theory.91
Most compensation discrimination suits involve more than
one plaintiff and may be appropriate for class actions,92 the
third type of Title VII suit. Generally the plaintiffs will need to
prove that their employer's neutral practices have a disparate
impact on the class as a whole. In Griggs v. Duke Power,98 the
Supreme Court held that proof of specific discriminatory intent
was not required under Title VII, but would be inferred from a
showing of disparate impact.~ The Court found that "Congress
directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. "915
A prima facie case under this theory begins with a showing
of disparate impact on plaintiffs as a class. This is usually done
88. 411 u.s. 792 (1973).
89. Id. at 802.
90.Id.
91. Nevertheless, the McDonnell-Douglas formula was intended to be flexible and
could be applied to a compensation suit. In that case the plaintiff might have to show 1)
that 8he was a member of a group protected by Title VIT, 2) that her qualifications and

job requirements were comparable to workers in other areas, 3) that despite her worth,
she was paid less than other workers, and 4) the other workers were not members of the
class.
92. Class actions brought under Title VIT must comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94.Id.
95. Id. at 432.
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with statistical evidence that illustrates a numerical disparity
between members of the plaintiffs' class and other groups in the
desired position.98 A showing of a disproportionate impact on a
class creates a rebuttable presumption of a Title VII violation.
Thus, if no women are selected on a job for which there were
numerous female applicants, the court will find an inference of
illegality. The burden then shifts to the employer to raise the
business necessity defense.
The business necessity defense places "on the employer the
burden of showing that any given [job] requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."9? Proof of
a manifest relationship will depend on the nature of the challenged practice. Generally, an employer must show there was an
overriding, legitimate business purpose behind the practice and
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation
of the business.98 Once the employer shows sufficient "job relatedness" of the practice, the employees are given an opportunity
to prove the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.99 If
such an alternative exists, the employer's business necessity defense will fail.
Damages
In a Title VII suit, a successful plaintiff is entitled to back

pay and attorney's fees;loo generally no punitive or exemplary
damages will be awarded. 101 The court may grant a preliminary
injunction if the plaintiff shows a probability of success on the
merits and proof of irreparable harm. 102
96. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), in which plaintiffs
asserted that an employment test discriminated against blacks. A prima facie case consisted of proof that "the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a
racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Id. at 409.
97. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 436.
98. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321. (1977).
99.Id.
100. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . • . an
unlawful employment practice. • . the court may enjoin respondent. . • and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1978).
101. Id. Although the statute generally does not provide for an award of punitive
damages, they have occasionally been granted. See Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5460 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
102. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice
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C. EQuAL PAY ACT vs. TITLE VII
Often a plaintiff will need to elect between suing under the
Equal Pay Act and suing under Title VII. Each puts a heavy
burden on the plaintiff. Even where a plaintiff can meet the substantially equal requirement of the Equal Pay Act/oS the employer has a variety of available defenses. 1M In a Title VII suit,
the plaintiff has more options for proving a case, ranging from
proof of discriminatory intent to mere proof of disparate impact.
The court has not yet enunciated the requisite burden of proof
for a Title VII wage discrimination suit, but the disparate impact formula may apply. One final benefit of an Equal Pay Act
suit, however, is the availability of a larger award, including
back pay and double damages. 105
III.

THE BENNETT AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY-THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EQUAL PAY
ACT AND TITLE VII

Because Title VII prohibits discriminatory compensation
based on sex, courts have experienced difficUlty determining its
proper construction in relationship to the Equal Pay Act. Confusion has been heightened by the Bennett Amendment to Title
VII,106 which states: "It shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or
compensation paid employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]."
Two interpretations of the Amendment have emerged during recent litigation.10'1 Both address the same question: how
.•.." 42 u.s.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1978).
103. For a discussion of the Equal Pay Act, see notes 53-66 supra and accompanying
text.
104. Defenses are discussed at notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text.
105. For an explanation of remedies, see notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
106. The amendment, found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. II 1978), was named
for its author, Republican Senator Bennett of Utah.
107. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits held, in Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511
F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); and Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117
(10th Cir. 1971), that a compensation discrimination claim under Title VII must meet
the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the
Bennett Amendment only incorporates the Equal Pay Act's defenses into Title VII and
therefore allows a claim of wage discrimination without an allegation of equal work. IUE
o
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much of the Equal Pay Act is incorporated into Title VII
through the Bennett Amendment? One view maintains that
wage discrimination suits brought under Title VII must comply
with all the requirements of the Equal Pay Act;I08 the other
holds that only the defenses enumerated in the Equal Pay Act
are available to an employer charged with wage discrimination
under Title VILlo9 The first interpretation requires a showing of
job equality in all compensation discrimination suits; the latter
is more flexible and may allow a plaintiff to prove discrimination
where the jobs are merely comparable.

A.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The interpretation favored by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits
limits Title VII wage discrimination suits to situations in which
the jobs are substantially equal according to the Equal Pay Act
standards. llo In Ammons v. Zia, I I I the Tenth Circuit held that
the Equal Pay Act and the Title VII compensation provisions
are in pari materia and must therefore be construed in harmony
with each other.lls The court made no Bennett Amendment
analysis and concluded that the plaintiff must prove the jobs in
question were "substantially equal" to make a prima facie showing of discrimination under Title VII.lls
The Ammons court assumed applicability of the in pari
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981).
108. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 244 (1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
109. IDE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v.
County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303
(1980), aft'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981).
110. A successful Equal Pay Act claim requires that the jobs in question involve
tI equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and that they be performed under similar working
conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978).
111. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff failed both to show that the denial of
Apollo test site clearance granted to male employees would have entitled her to higher
pay, and that she was performing work equal to that done by higher paid males.
112. ld. at 119 (quoting Shultz v. Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970». Many other courts have agreed that the two statutes are in
pari materia; see Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); Cullari v. East-West Gateway, 457 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Disalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 416 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
113. 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971).
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materia doctrine to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act; other
courts have given it similar summary treatment. ll4 Generally,
statutes are held to be in pari materia when they pertain to the
same subject matter or were enacted with the same purpose in
mind, and as such, are construed as one body of law, giving effect to every provision in each statute.UII The Ammons court
presumably relied on the doctrine as it applies to general and
special statutes, which provides that when one statute specifies
procedures or subjects touched upon in a broader statute, the
specialized statute controls.u6
The Third Circuit declined to apply the in pari materia
doctrine in IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.u7 and stated
that "it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's caution that
remedies for employment discrimination 'supplement' each
other and should not be construed so as to ignore the differences
among them."118 This interpretation implies that the Equal Pay
Act and Title VII have important differences and that each act
should increase, and not denigrate, the protections offered by
the other.
The Bennett Amendment gives force to the in pari materia
argument and indicates that Congress, aware that confusion over
statutory construction might arise, enacted Title VII with the
Equal Pay Act in mind. Unfortunately, the language of the
114. See cases cited note 112 supra.
115. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973).
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that whenever
the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held
that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment
therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they
should all be construed together.
• • • Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are
to be compared with the new provision; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be so construed that effect is
given to every provision of all of them.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
116. This is suggested by the Third Circuit's discussion of Westinghouse's allegations in WE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980):" 'Where there is
no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of priority of enactment.' " Id. at 1101 (quoting Radzanower v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976». See C. SANDS, note 115 supra, § 15.05.
117. 631 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1980).
118. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974».
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Amendment is ambiguous and vague as to what is specifically
allowed under Title VII. Courts holding that the Equal Pay Act
completely controls wage discrimination suits under Title VII
have consistently avoided a discussion of statutory language and
construction, giving no legal basis for their conclusions beyond
the bare citation of the statute and amendment. U9
The Ninth and Third Circuits, on the other hand, have
closely examined the language of the statutes to reach a different interpretation of the Amendment.120 Although the Bennett
Amendment allows a wage differential if it is authorized by the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act, the only differentials expressly
authorized are those based on the four enumerated defenses. 121
In Gunther v. County of Washington,122 the Ninth Circuit
stated:
The Equal Pay Act applies only when a plaintiff
has been denied equal pay for equal work, and
authorizes a differentiation only where one of the
four defenses is invoked. The Equal Pay Act does
not "authorize" differentiations in the absence of
equal work; in those cases it simply does not apply. Read literally, the amendment only incorporates the Equal Pay Act's defenses. If Congress
had intended to say that wage differentials do not
119. In Ammons, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "to prove a case of discrimination under Title VIT, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for performing
equal work." 448 F.2d at 120. The court cited no authority for this proposition beyond
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Citing Ammons, the Fifth Circuit, in Orr v.
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975), found
that any wage differential authorized under the Equal Pay Act is not unlawful under
Title VII. A more recent Tenth Circuit case also approved Ammons. In Lemons v. City
of Denver, 620 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980), city-employed nurses contended that the city's wage scheme, based on the community wage
scale, discriminated against women in violation of Title VII. The court stated: "The Bennett Amendment is generally considered to have the equal pay/work concept apply to
Title VII in the same way as it applies in the Equal Pay Act." ld. at 229-30 (emphasis
added).
120. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980). This interpretation is also supported by
dictum in Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water, 553 F.2d 581, 590
(9th Cir.), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978).
122. 602 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). For a discussion of the opinion issued on rehearing,
see text accompanying note 170 infra.
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violate Title VII unless they violate the Equal
Pay Act, it could have easily said SO.123

The Third Circuit approved the Gunther interpretation in IUE
v. Westinghouse Corp. defining the term "authorized" as
describing something endorsed or expressly permitted, rather
than merely something not prohibited.123.1 The IUE court also
recognized a well-established rule of construction, somewhat the
converse of in pari materia, which states that when two statutes
concern the same subject matter but one contains additional
provisions not included in the other, the omission of the provisions indicates different intentions behind the two statutes.124
Title VII does not expressly require equal work in compensation
suits, whereas the Equal Pay Act includes the "substantially
equal" requirement. According to the Third Circuit's reasoning,
the omission of the "substantially equal" provision from Title
VII indicates a congressional intent to allow a broader application than is possible under the Equal Pay Act. This interpretation is reinforced by the chronological aspect of the statutory
history. The Equal Pay Act was an initial, narrow and highly
focused piece of legislation, while Title VII was a strong, broad
statement of policy to be implemented as necessary for maximum enforcement.
B.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BENNETT AMENDMENT

The scanty legislative history accompanying the Bennett
Amendment reveals little about the purpose for including the
Amendment in Title VII.12~ While introducing the Amendment,
Senator Bennett stated his personal intent that "[in] the event
123. 623 F.2d at 1319. This view is also supported by dictum in Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
123.1 631 F.2d at 1101.
124. 631 F.2d at 1101. This argument is also made in Gunther; see discussion at
note 120 supra.
125.
The legislative materials on the Bennett Amendment are remarkable only for their equivocacy and turbidity. As has oft
been noted, sex was added as a protected classification late in
the debate on the Civil Rights Act. • . . The Amendment was
not part of the [Act] when it had first passed the House and
was sent to the Senate, although the Act at that time included
the prohibition against sex discrimination. The amendment
was included later on on the floor of the House after cloture
and was adopted following a very brief colloquoy.
[d. at 1101-02.
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of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
nullified. "126 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits chose not to discuss
the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment,127 while both
the Ninth and Third Circuits relied on the congressional record
in their decisions. 128 The Ninth and Third Circuits concluded
that the remarks of Senator Dirksen, that "the Fair Labor Standards Act carries out certain exceptions, and . . . [a]II that the
pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions that are
carried in the basic act,"129 combined with those of Senator Bennett, indicate an intent to incorporate only the four Equal Pay
Act defenses into Title VII.130
126. The legislative record reads:
MR. BENNETI: Mr. President, after many years of yearning
by members of the fair sex in this country, after very careful
study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year
Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became
effective only yesterday.
By this time programs have been established for the effective administration of this Act. Now, when the Civil Rights
bill is under consideration, in which the word 'sex' has been
inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and the Equal Pay
Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the
event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall
not be nullified.
MR. HUMPHREY: The amendment of the Senator from
Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed. I thank him for his
thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully acceptable.
MR. DIRKSEN: Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because
the Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act carries out certain
exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recogni2e those
exceptions, that are carried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary in the interest of
clarification.
110 CONGo REc. 13647 (1964).
127. See cases cited note 119 supra.
128. See cases cited note 120 supra.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. See cases cited note 120 supra. Senator Dirksen's statement refers to exceptions; the Equal Pay Act's exceptions are its four defenses. Because no circuit reaching
an opposite conclusion has discussed legislative history, it is impossible to determine
what their interpretation would have been. Arguments posed by Judge Van Dusen in his
JUE dissent present a contradictory view of legislative history, but the interpretation is
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Attempting to controvert this conclusion, defendants in
IUE and Gunther1S1 introduced two documents. The first was a
portion of the legislative record showing a pre-enactment question and answer session which occurred two months before the
proposal of the Bennett Amendment, just after the word "sex"
was added to Title VII.1s2 The exchange focused on the fact that
Title VII does not include the equal work requirements present
in the Equal Pay Act, and on how the two acts were to be reconciled. In response, Senator Clark concluded that the standards
set out in the Equal Pay Act apply to the "comparable situation" under Title VII.1sS While Senator Clark's response cannot
clarify the Bennett Amendment, as it had not yet been written,
it does show a congressional concern over the relationship between the two acts.
The Ninth Circuit used Senator Clark's answer to reinforce
its holding. When plaintiffs allege equal work, yet base their
claim on a violation of Title VII, it is a "comparable situation"
unsupported. Summarizing Senator Bennett's statement, supra note 126, Judge Van Dusen remarked:
[The] statement is open to different interpretations because
Senator Bennett did not specify the provisions of the Equal
Pay Act to which he was referring. I believe, however, the
most logical interpretation of the statement is that Senator
Bennett was referring to the equal work provisions of the
Equal Pay Act.
631 F.2d at 112-13 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
131. The Ninth Circuit panel issued a second opinion in Gunther, after a petition
for rehearing was filed by the County of Washington. The court discussed additional
documents that were submitted at that time. 623 F.2d 1303, 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. The objection was raised by Senator Dirksen and answered by Senator Clark:
Objection: The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the
bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But
more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and coverage
of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in
that act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal
skills in the same establishments, and thus, cut across different jobs.
Answer: The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour
law, with different coverage and numerous exemptions than
those under Title VII. Furthermore, under Title VII, jobs can
no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of a bona fide
occupational qualification. The standards in the Equal Pay
Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are
applicable to the comparable situation under Title VII.
110 CONGo REc. 7217 (1964).
133. [d.
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to an Equal Pay Act claim and, therefore, Equal Pay Act standards must be applied. Absent a claim of equal work, however,
the alleged discriminatory conduct must be analyzed und,er Title
VII, which requires no showing of job equality. Although the
Third Circuit acknowledged a different interpretation was plausible,ls4 it ultimately agreed with the Gunther COurt.1S5
The second document submitted by defendants in IUE and
Gunther constitutes ex post facto legislative history. One year
after Title VII, in an attempt to clarify the growing confusion
surrounding the interpretation of the Amendment/se Senator
Bennett inserted the following statement into the record: "If the
Bennett Amendment is to be given any effect, it must be interpreted to mean that discrimination in compensation on account
of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the Equal
Pay Act."IS7 In considering the statement, the Gunther court
stated:
Either from a legal standpoint or as a practical
m~tter, Senator Bennett's statement cannot express what was on Congress' collective mind when
it acted a year earlier. If Senator Bennett's "clarifying" statement has any significance, it must be
as evidence that the amendment was ambiguous
on its face and its contemporaneous legislative
134. This interpretation is also acknowledged by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. See
cases cited note 119 supra.
135. IUE, 631 F.2d at 1107.
136. Senator Bennett cited the time pressure on Congress during the original debates as the reason for this later addition'to the record. He explained: "As an example of
what has occurred because of the confusion and near chaos that prevailed on those days,
I find myself today under the necessity of trying to create legislative history that should
have been created then." 111 CONGo REC. 13359 (1965).
137.
Section 6(d) authorizes ..•
1. Wage differentials on equal jobs made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment practice; ••• (b) to have different standards
of compensation for nonexempt employees where such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.
,
Simply stated, the amendment means that discrimination
in compensation on 'account of sex does not violate Title VII
unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act.
Id.
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history was not enlightening. ISS

In IUE, the Third Circuit looked also to EEOC regulations
to define the relationship of the Equal Pay Act to Title VII. It
found the EEOC favors an expansive interpretation of Title
VII.ls9 Regulations specify that, while the Equal Pay Act is controlling in situations where both statutes apply, Title VII is not
necessarily limited by the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. HO
The IUE court reasoned that the Equal Pay Act applies only
when a claim of equal work is made; barring such a claim, Title
VII controls in wage discrimination cases.I n
One issue which has been largely ignored by the courts is
the overall effect of the two possible interpretations of the Bennett Amendment on Title VII. The courts have not yet discussed
the practical application of the Equal Pay Act defenses to Title
VII. Nor have the courts considered whether the Bennett
Amendment restricts an employer's defenses in a Title VII com138. 623 F.2d at 1318.
In IUE, the Third Circuit followed Gunther, but Judge Van Dusen's dissent gave
great weight to postenactment comments by legislators. In Sioux Tribe v. United States, .
316 U.S. 317 (1942), the court held that a statement by a member of the drafting committee of an act made five years after the statute was passed was "conclusive" as to the
meaning of the statute. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953), cited by both the majority and the dissent in IUE, the court upheld the deportation of a Mexican alien for
membership in the Communist Party, even though he proved that he was unaware they
advocated violence against the government. A 1951 amendment to the Internal Security
Act of 1950 excluded those who were duped into joining the Party from the definition of
"member." During the debate over the amendment, however, several members of Congress claimed that, even with the amendment, the word member would be given the
same meaning as in the original statute.
Galvan may be distinguished from the cases involving the Bennett Amendment because the statements made in Galvan are part of the contemporaneous legislative history
of the amendment in question, having been made during the congressional debates. The
memorandum by Senator Bennett was not part of the debate and is therefore not
contemporaneous.
139. See Decision No. 70-112, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 116108 (1969); Decision No.
70-0695, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 11 6148 (1970).
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1980) provides:
Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act.
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based on sex contained in Title VII is coextensive
with that of other prohibitions contained in Title VII and is
not limited by [the Bennett Amendment] to those employees
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of [the Bennett Amendment], a defense
based on the Equal Pay Act may be raised in a proceeding
under Title VII.
141. 631 F.2d at 1106.
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pensation suit to only those defenses enumerated in the Equal
Pay Act, or whether it also allows the employer to raise Title VII
defenses as well.
If the Bennett Amendment is determined to incorporate en-

tirely Title VII's compensation provisions into the Equal Pay
Act, then it would seem that regular Title VII defenses should
not be allowed. On the other hand, if all the Bennett Amendment does is permit an employer to raise Equal Pay Act defenses in response to a wage discrimination charge under Title
VII, then perhaps they may be raised in addition to the usual
Title VII defenses. It is important to note that the bona fide
occupational qualification only applies to charges of facial or intentional discrimination and thus would not often arise in a
comparable worth situation. Business necessity, however, may be
raised to counter a charge of disparate impact. Such a defense
would be difficult to establish in a compensation case, however,
unless the court were willing to accept mere econOInic necessity,
which they have not yet done.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARABLE WORTH IN
THE COURTS
Courts are gradually acknowledging and reviewing the theory that women should be paid according to the value of their
work rather than by extrinsic, stereotypic standards. No court
has yet fully accepted a legal application of the theory of comparable worth, and the Supreme Court's decision in Gunther sidestepped the issue. The basis for judicial acceptance or rejection
of a comparable worth standard, however, lies outside the realm
of the Courts. Some courts have gone beyond mere statutory construction to consider economic questions which underlie the legal issues. 142 Decisions based on economic principles, however,
are not always just, and may be heavily influenced by the power
of business interests. As is indicated by the cases discussed below, these interests, and how much weight the courts choose to
grant them, provide the ultimate basis for most decisions in this
area.
142. See cases cited note 4 supra.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT

The controversy surrounding the Bennett Amendment and
the interpretation of Title VII has led several courts to go beyond rules of construction into the hazy area.of legislative intent. Because there is no relevant record concerning the compensation provisions of Title VII, courts have based their decisions
on interpretations of the congressional intent of the Equal Pay
Act and have formulated a strong argument against the equal
pay for comparable worth concept because of the economic burden involved.14s
The congressional record reveals that an early version of the
Equal Pay Act mandated equal pay for work of a "comparable
character," rather than equal pay for equal work.14<l This language was modified to its current form after some debate in the
House of Representatives. The major proponent of the modification, Representative St. George, argued that women wanted
nothing less than absolute equality. She believed that a comparable standard would lessen, rather than increase, the chances of
equality for women in the same way that protective legislation
may further discrimination against women by fostering stereotypic responses and attitudes.1 <l5
Proponents of the comparable worth standard argued that
an equality standard would often be impossible to prove and
would impose an undue hardship on women. One House member
argued that the equal work standard failed to address the problem of job segregation and would, in fact, leave many women
unprotected. 146 The House nevertheless adopted the more re143. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244
(1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865
(1975).
144. The original provision tinder consideration was: "Employers must pay equal
wages to employees doing comparable work, the performance of which requires comparable skill." 108 CONGo REc. 14754 (1962).
145. Representative St. George (R. New York) remarked: "As a woman, I do not
particularly want to be compared to a man ••.." 108 CONGo RBc. 14768 (1962).
She also believed that, under a comparable standard, quality of work could be compared, which might lead to further discrimination against women doing equal work. ld.
at 14767.
146. Representative Stratton (D. New York) offered the following prediction which
indeed has come to pass:
[What if] we were confronted with a situation in Gloversville,
for example, where we have people sewing knitted gloves in
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strictive version. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have used this
record to show that Congress intended to deny application of a
comparable worth standard in all wage discrimination suits.147 In
Lemons v. City of Denver,148 the Tenth Circuit, citing the Congressional Record, focused on the economic implications of comparing entirely different jobs.149 The economic and business aspects of the comparable standard were raised only once during
the House discussion concerning modification of the Equal Pay
Act, when it was argued that "comparable" was too vague for
businesses to apply consistently.u50
It appears from the record that the congressional motive for
the modification from comparable to equal was chiefly one of
concern for women. While the difficulty of enforcing a comparable standard was noted, the House did not expressly dismiss the
standard. Representative St. George's arguments were basically
philosophical, but it seems that a majority of House members
credited her opinion, because she was a woman, as representing
the best economic interests of all women. If, as the record indicates, the House based its decision on a desire to offer the widest
protection possible, one must conclude they did not intend to
conclusively exclude a theory of comparable worth, or any other
one bUilding and sewing leather gloves in another, [I wonder]
whether under [Mrs. St. George's] amendment, it may not
turn out this is not equal work. . . . [W]ould it not be easy for
an employer to argue in such cases that these operations were
not equal, so if all of those sewing knitted gloves happened to
be women and all of those sewing leather gloves happened to
be men, might it not be possible. . . for an employer to evade
the clear intent of Congress in passing this legislation?
108 CONGo REc. 14771 (1962).
147. See cases cited note 143 supra. In Orr, the court cited an Equal Pay Act case,
Brennan V. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973), which held that Congress substituted the word equal for the word comparable to require that the jobs involved be virtually identical.
148. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
149. See notes 159-172 infra and accompanying text.
150. Representative Landrum (D. Georgia) raised this argument:
If, in fact, we want to establish equal pay for equal work, then
we ought to say so and not permit the trooping around all over
the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing
business with their various interpretations of the term "comparable" when "equal" is capable of the same definition
throughout the United States.
108 CONGo REc. 14767-68 (1962).
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theory which would help end employment discrimination against
women.
B.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH

Perhaps the best argument against a theory of equal pay for
comparable work is the potential economic impact it would have
on businesses. 1II1 Several courts have held that Title VII is not
intended to remedy discrimination if to do so would require altering the economic structure of the marketplace.11l2

In Christensen v. Iowa/liS female clerical workers sued their
employer, the university, alleging wage discrimination under Title VII. They sought to compare the work of the exclusivelY female clerical stafflll4 with the work of the predominantly male
physical plant workers.lllll The university set wages by giving
each job a point value and matching salaries to points accrued. 11l6 But because physical plant workers in the local job
market received wages higher than those assigned by the univer151. Smith, The EEOC's Bold Foray into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978,
at 59, portrays the economic effect of requiring a comparable worth standard for wage
determination:
[A comparable worth requirement] would certainly correct imbalances rapidly, but the economy would surely be
much disrupted in the process. At the extreme, to raise the
aggregate pay of the country's 27.3 million full-time working
women high enough so that the median pay for women would
equal that of men would add a staggering $150 billion a year
to civilian payrolls. Such a radical step, of course seems too
preposterious to be taken seriously. But even partial measures
-a more likely bet-would have enormous impact, undoubtedly aggravated by demands from unioni2ed workers in traditionally male jobs that their pay be increased correspondingly."
152. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244
(1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
153. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
154. The clerical staff included the following positions: account clerk, key entry operator, data technician, typist, secretary, and mail clerk. Id. at 354 n.3.
155. The physical plant workers included carpet layers, mail carriers, tree trimmers,
parking enforcement officers, bus drivers, electricians, locksmiths, upholsterers, mechanics, plasterers, carpenters, and plumbers. Id.
156. This is a frequently used method of job evaluation. A typist position, for example, will be broken into certain factors such as skill required, amount of supervision necessary, etc. For each factor, the job will receive points, depending on the degree to which
the factor figures in the job. Points are tallied and jobs with equal points are assigned
the same range of wages. For a further discussion of job evaluation techniques, see notes
189-212 infra and accompanying text.
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sity, the university raised the physical plant workers' pay to
equal the community pay scale. I57 The university's compensation scheme, although ostensibly an attempt to equalize wage
differentials, broke down because of the alleged need to compete
with the local market, whose practices discriminated against women. The Eighth Circuit found appellants had not established a
prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII because
they did not adequately demonstrate that the wage differential
between clerical workers and physical plant workers was based
on the employer's discriminatory practices. In addition, the
court held the university's dependence on the local labor market
was sufficient reason for the wage differential. I5s
The Christensen court refused to extend Title VII to an
area it believed to be outside of the scope of equal opportunity
as defined by the Supreme COurt. I59 Appellants argued the university was liable because it was perpetuating the discrimination
found in the community. The Eighth Circuit responded:
Equality of opportunity is not at issue here. . . .
Appellants' theory ignores economic realities. The
value of the job to the employer represents but
one factor affecting wages. Other factors may include the supply of workers willing to do the job
and the ability of workers to band together to
bargain collectively for higher wages. We find
nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the
laws of supply and demand or other economic
principles that determine wage rates for various
kinds of work. We do not interpret Title VII as
157. 563 F.2d at 354.
158. [d. Because appellants did not establish a prima facie case, the court found it
unnecessary to confront the Bennett Amendment.
By way of distinction to the facts presented in this case,
we might note that if the record had established that the University relied upon prevailing community wage rates in setting
pay scales for male-dominated jobs but paid less than community wages for jobs primarily staffed by women, we would necessarily reach the Bennett Amendment issue.
Id. at 355 n.6.
159. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." 563 F.2d at 356 (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971».
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requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications. leo

Crucial to the court's decision was the notion that an employer
should not be liable for perpetuating prevailing discriminatory
community practices. The court did not believe that Title VII
allows judicial regulation of the marketplace to the extent of
forcing an employer, not guilty of any direct, overt discrimination, to pay for the wrongs of society as a whole. But application
of Title VII to wage discrimination, discharge, or hiring practices, indeed requires an employer to guarantee that the particular wrongs of society are corrected. Even more so, quotas, special
opportunity programs, and affirmative action, all potentially affect the innocent business operator, entrepreneur, or person who
has never engaged in any intentional discrimination.
In Lemons, the Tenth Circuit held that the court does not
have the power to interrupt the normal operation of the marketplace. In Lemons, city nurses sued the city because they felt
their wage scale, which reflected that of the local job market,
under-valued nurses and nursing as a traditional woman's job.lsl
Citing Christensen, the court held that under existing law courts
could not require an employer who had acted in good faith to reevaluate the worth of each job in relation to other jobs, especially when this would disregard the community job market. lss
The court stated that comparisons between jobs requiring entirely different skills would "be a whole new world for the courts
and until some better signal from Congress is received we cannot
venture into it."16S
C.

GUNTHER

v.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

In two recent cases, the Ninth and Third Circuits have ven160. ld. (footnote omitted).
161. The court did recognize the issue:
The relationship of pay for nurses to pay for other positions is
obviously the product of past attitudes, practices, and perhaps
of supply and demand. The record shows that it becanle a part
of the economic balance and relationships prevailing in the
community among the myriad of positions in the job market.
620 F.2d at 229.
162. ld. at 230.
163. ld. at 229.
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tured into the "new world" of comparable worth. Gunther v.
County of Washington 164, was the first case in which any circuit
has held a claim of wage discrimination need not mirror an
Equal Pay Act claim. The plaintiffs in Gunther were four women matrons at the county jail, assigned to guard female prisoners. Male guards were paid a higher wage than the matrons for
guarding male prisoners. The plaintiffs sued under Title VII, alleging unequal pay for equal work, and retaliatory discharge.1611
Finding plaintiffs' work not substantially equal to that of the
male guards, the district court ruled for the county. On appeal,
in addition to their equal pay claim under Title VII, plaintiffs
asserted that even if they did not perform substantially equal
work, at least some of the discrepancy in pay could only be explained by sex discrimination. 166
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that
the matron's work differed from that of the male guards, but
further held that job equality is not necessarily determinative in
compensation discrimination cases. 16'1 After reviewing the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment, and the language of
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, the panel concluded that Title
VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act. "If we were to limit Title
VII's protection against sexually discriminatory compensation
practices to those covered by the Equal Pay Act, we would in
effect insulate other equally harmful discriminatory practices
from review. m6s
The appellants' allegation of "other discriminatory practices" proved essential to the court's ruling:
[A]lthough decisions interpreting the Equal Pay
164. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aff'd, 49
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981).
165. Although they initially stated a claim under the Equal Pay Act, plaintiffs were
forced to sue under Title VII because, at the time of employment, the Equal Pay Act did
not apply to government employees. 602 F.2d at 886 n.4.
166. Essentially, this would require a claim that the matrons were discriminated
against in terms of compensation, because their wages were determined by gender. Such
a claim seems to counter the Equal Pay Act defense that wages were set by any other
factor other than sex.
167. It is important to note this is the first case where a finding that equal work was
not performed did not prevent the court from determining that some other discrimination might be involved.
168. 602 F.2d at 890 (footnote omitted).
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Act are authoritative where plaintiffs suing under
Title VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are
not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation practices
unless the practices are authorized [by the Equal
Pay Act's defenses].169

The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued a second opinion in Gunther,170 in response to a petition for rehearing, to clarify its position. The court did not fully embrace a theory of comparable
worth. Rather, they seemed to respond to the Fifth, Tenth, and
Eighth Circuits' refusal to review wage discrimination cases that
did not meet the Equal Pay Act requirements, even when there
had been no allegation of "substantially equal" work. In the second opinion, the Ninth Circuit stated:
The effect of our decision will not be to substitute
a "comparable" work standard for an "equal"
work standard. Where a Title VII plaintiff . . .
attempts to establish a prima facie case based
solely on a comparison of the work she performs,
she will have to show that her job requirements
are substantially equal, not comparable, to that of
a similarly situated male. . . . All we hold here is
that a plaintiff is not precluded from establishing
sex-based wage discrimination under some other
theory compatible with Title VII. It is unnecessary to determine now what theories might be
feasible. We do note that, because a comparable
work standard cannot be substituted for an equal
work standard, evidence of comparable work, although not necessarily irrelevant in proving discrimination under some alternative theory, will
not alone be sufficient to establish a prima facie
case.171

Thus, the Gunther court hesitantly set out the foundations
of a theory of comparable worth. According to the court, an allegation that different wages are paid to workers performing jobs
of comparable worth, without some further charge of discrimination, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title
169. ld. at 891.
170. .623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
171. ld. at 1321.
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Although the court did not specify under what situations
or alternative theories job comparisons might be relevant, one of
the most recent compensation discrimination cases presents an
excellent example. l7S

VII.172

D.

IUE

v.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

In IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,174 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the standard suggested in Gunther.175
Plaintiffs, members of the Electrical Union, charged their employer, Westinghouse, with wage discrimination under Title VII.
Westinghouse used a wage classification system in which each
job was assigned a labor grade number based on the number of
points tallied, with lower grades receiving lower salaries.176 The
job evaluations were originally done in 1939 and a keysheet was
developed at that time which enumerated wages of jobs at each
level. Separate keysheets were maintained for jobs filled by women and jobs filled by men; the grade levels on the women's
keysheet received lower wages than identical levels on the men's
list.177 In 1965, Westinghouse devised a new single keysheet,
which plaintiffs contended merely disguised the old discriminatory system. Female jobs were placed far below male jobs given
equivalent grades on the old keysheets. Company records
showed that all employees but one, working in labor grades one
through four, were women, and that eighty-five percent of the
women working at the plant were assigned to these low level
jobs.l7S

Plaintiffs contented the grades were assigned according to
whether the position had been traditionally filled by a woman or
a man, and that predominantly female jobs were assigned lower
wages, resulting in a highly unequal pay distribution. The district court found that, because the plaintiffs did not allege that
male and female employees performed "substantially equal"
172. [d.
173. See note 176 infra and accompanying text.
174. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
175. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
176. See notes 187-210 infra and accompanying text.
177. As the 1939 Westinghouse Industrial Relations Manual explained: "Basically
then, we have another wage curve or key sheet for women below and not parallel with,
the men's curve." 631 F.2d at 1097 (emphasis in original).
178. [d.
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work, the employer had not violated Title VII.179 On appeal, the
Third Circuit was unable to ignore Westinghouse's discriminatory employment practices and reversed the district COurt.180
Mer deciding the Bennett Amendment incorporated only
the four enumerated Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII,18l
the court reviewed the allegation of wage discrimination. The
court found Westinghouse's system blatantly discriminated
against women workers. Although the plaintiffs' claim was based
on discriminatory compensation, that compensation had been
determined by a discriminatory evaluation system. Because Title VII clearly prohibits an employer from paying workers performing different jobs different wages if wages are determined
by race or religion, the court determined that
[i]n the absence of explicit statutory language or
Supreme Court holdings to the contrary, we are
hesitant to conclude that Title VII would allow
discriminatory behavior on the basis of sex, when
the same behavior would be prohibited if made on
the basis of race, religion, or national origin.182

In Gunther, the Ninth Circuit held that a prima facie case
would not be established solely on a showing of job comparability but that wage discrimination could be proven under "some
other theory compatible with Title VII."l8S In JUE, the plaintiffs
proved wage discrimination by showing a discriminatory job
evaluation system, thus providing an alternative theory of discrimination. Evidence supporting the theory showed the jobs in
question had at one time been given identical labor grades and,
therefore, were of comparable worth to the employer, but that
wages had been determined by the sex of the employee and not
according to worth. Although never explicitly articulated, JUE
allowed a comparison of dissimilar jobs to prove
discrimination. 18'
179. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 119144 (D.N.J. 1979).
180. 631 F.2d. at 1094.
181. [d. at 1101.
182. [d. at 1100 (footnote omitted).

183. 623 F.2d at 1321.
184. 631 F.2d at 1094.
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V. PROVING A COMPARABLE WORTH CASE
It is difficult to prove that an employer has committed wage

discrimination against women. With IUE as a guide, it appears
some courts may be willing to compare different jobs in situations where there are intentional wage differentials between
male and female jobs not covered by the narrow language of the
Equal Pay Act. 1811 The Ninth Circuit and Third Circuits require
a showing of a discriminatory practice before a claim of comparable worth will be discussed. 186 Often, as in IUE, wage discrimination is confirmed either by the employer's method of setting
wages, or its job evaluation system.
A.

METHODS USED TO SET WAGES

Employers use a wide range of methods to set wages. Understanding these methods may be crucial in proving wage discrimination under Title VII. Although many employers use complex methods of wage determination, some continue to use the
basic ranking method. With this method, the employer fixes
wages by observing a job and ranking it in relation to other
jobs. 187 The hazard of the ranking method is that the employer
may allow biased personal preference, about current employees
and the job itself, to weight the determination. 188
The market method is a second method used to set wages. 189
The employer matches the wages of employees to those of similarly situated employees, in the community or any other competitive unit in the labor market. 190 Thus, if women have been traditionally segregated into low-paying jobs in the local labor
market, an employer will only perpetuate existing wage discrimi185. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978).
186. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), a/f'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981); ruE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
187. R. SmSON, COMPENSATION: A COMPLETE REVISION OF "WAGES AND SALARIES" 3839 (1974). See Cody, The Comparable Worth Slot Machine: Does Job Evaluation Give
Every Player an Even Break?, 1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE GUIDE IV-15 (J. Erickson,
K. McGovern eds. 1979).
188. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 38. Cody, supra note 187, at IV-28, points out,
however, that from an employer's perspective this method is easy to use, easy to understand, consumes little time, and minimizes paperwork.
189. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 44.
190. [d.
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nation by adopting a market standard. l9l The market method is
generally used with a classification system as a means of rating
job levels, such as Typist I or Assistant Researcher III. While
the classification system may be facially gender-neutral, discrimination can occur when wage classifications are made in accordance with what a similar job has traditionally paid in the labor
market. The market method was approved by the court in Lemons, even though it resulted in discriminatory wage levels for
city nurses. I92
A classification system may also be applied independent of
market comparisons, using a rating scale based on internal company grade levels. I93 This technique can be subjective, for even
though all jobs are set against the same standard and treated
alike, the system tends to depend on arbitrarily assigned job
levels within the organizational hierarchy rather than levels of
work performance. I9'
191. From an employer's point of view this may be an advantage.
The major advantage of the market evaluation system is
that the market is built into the program from the start,
thereby insuring that evaluation results conform to the realities of the marketplace . • . .
. . . In the traditional evaluation approach . • . no one
can ever really satisfactorily explain why a salesman is in a
higher grade than, say, an accountant. But if the answer is
that salesmen at a given level are paid more than accountants
at a given level that is simply describing what exists. The company did not make these judgments; the labor market did.
The market has valued work done and the experience that
goes with doing the work. These are clearly more objective
than subjective job evaluation decisions and therefore tend to
be more acceptable to employees.
[d. at 44-45 (emphasis in original).
Unfortunately, this method has also been acceptable to the courts. See, e.g., Lemons
v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980). The
employer may rely on the market system as justification for paying women less than
men.
192. City jobs were first classified, then compared to the equivalent private sector
jobs, and assigned wages accordingly. Plaintiffs argued that the city's scheme upheld the
traditional under-valuation of nursing as a woman's job, and that their jobs should be
compared with non-nursing positions of equal value. 620 F.2d at 229.
193. Under this method, an employer assigns each job a grade level, and starts the
pay scale with Grade One, for example, which would receive the lowest salary. Salaries
increase with higher grades, but all jobs on the same level receive equal pay. R. SIBSON,
supra note 187, at 40.
194. Cody, supra note 187, at IV-27.
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More complex methods are the point/factor method and a
variation, the factor comparison method. 191S Under the more
common point method,196 jobs are analyzed and broken down
into compensable factors and subfactors,197 which in turn receive
195. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 40-42.
196. ld. at 40.
197. Cody lists the following possible factors and subfactors:
1. EXPERIENCE
A. Number of areas in which experience is required to
perform job effectively.
B. Amount of experience in each area required to perform job satisfactorily.
2. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
A. Number of areas in which education/training is
required.
B. Type of education/training: General-Technical
C. Frequency of use of education/training on job.
3. MENTAL DEMAND
A. Degree of mental application required.
B. Continuity of mental alertness.
C. Degree of diversity of mental demand.
4. VISUAL DEMAND
A. Degree of visual alertness required.
B. Continuity of visual alertness.
5. PHYSICAL DEMANDS
A. Pace of physical input.
B. Strength/endurance required.
C. Degree of continuity.
6. COMPLEXITY OF DUTIES
A. Types and diversity of problems handled: Routine Nonroutine.
B. Frequency of problems arising.
C. Amount of work required to respond to problems.
7. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL DEMANDS
A. Number, types, and frequency of deadlines to be
met.
B. Routine pace of job (rate of work turn-around).
C. How is work reviewed and by whom?
8. CONFINEMENT DEMANDS
A. Physical confinement.
B. Mental confinement; monotony.
C. Job potential confinement (dead-end job?).
9. HAZARDS/WORKING CONDITIONS
A. Probability of accidents/health hazards.
B. Severity of accidents/health hazards.
10. ABILITY TO EFFECT RESULTS
A. Independence of action.
B. Exercise of judgment/creativity.
11. ERRORS
A. How easily discerned.
B. Impact of error on orderly work flow.
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point values based on the factor's importance or worth to the
employer. Wages are set according to the point value. ISS A variation of this method is the factor comparison method, which assigns points to each job for the same standard factors, each of
which carry equal weight. ISS Jobs with equal points yield equal
wages.
Although the point/factor system is facially objective, it can
be discriminatory. Because the employer may give more weight
to factors such as physical effort or technical training, jobs
predominantly filled by women may be undervalued':~oo
C. Frequency of probability for error.
12. CONTACT WITH OTHERS
A. Frequency of contact.
B. Nature of contact/type of impact to be had by
individual.
C. How contacts made; individual VB. group.
D. Type of people contacted/range.
E. Skill required in contact: routine courtesy-creating
rapport- nonroutine decisions.
F. Loyalty to company/product.
13. RESPONSmILITY FOR CONFIDENTIAL DATA
A. Character of data.
B. Degree to which full import of data is apparent on
the job.
14. RESPONSmILITY FOR RECORDS AND REPORTS
A. Degree of care required to prevent inaccuracies.
B. Degree of loss/disruptive effect would result from
inaccuracies.
15. RESPONSmILITY FOR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT,
AND PRODUCT
A. Dollar value of equipment, etc.
B. Degree of care required to prevent mishap.
Cody, supra note 187, at IV-29 to IV-3!.
198. Wages are usually determined by isolating certain jobs as benchmark or key
jobs, and wages paid these jobs are matched to the point value assigned to them. A graph
is drawn with benchmark jobs marked on a wage line and all other jobs are aligned into
the correct place on the point scale. Grades and ranges are established on the graphs in
varying widths. [d. at IV-18.
199. These factors might include skill, physical demands, mental demands, responsibility, and working conditions. A benchmark system may be used to fix wages. The main
difference between factor comparison and point/factor is that in factor comparison all
jobs are rated by a standard set of factors with equal values, while in point/factor analysis any number of variable factors may appear. The employer will weigh each factor for
value, rather than giving each factor equal value. Both these methods are complex and
involve a great deal of paperwork. [d.
200. [d. at IV-28.
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PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION

Because the job evaluation process can be discriminatory,201
discovery of an employer's wage determination method may reveal inherent discrimination in compensation. In IUE202 the
plaintiffs used records of evaluation practices to prove intentional compensation discrimination. Westinghouse ostensibly
used a modified factor comparison method to set wages, but the
plaintiffs proved the method was not used fairly when rating
women's jobs.203 Only after the plaintiffs demonstrated that
Westinghouse used discriminatory evaluation practices did the
Third Circuit examine the jobs in question, and compare them
with other company jobs to determine if they had been undervalued.2M The employer's evaluation practice, by itself, was a violation of Title VII; it constituted intentional discrimination
against women in terms of compensation.
The fact situation in IUE is a model of the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion in Gunther05 that, while mere proof of comparable
work is insufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title
VII, proof of comparable worth can be used under some theory
other than equal work and be compatible with Title VII. An alternative theory suggested by plaintiffs in IUE was that the employer had engaged in discriminatory job evaluations, which resulted in wage inequality.206 Examining this assertion, the court
found a violation of Title VII based on gender-classified job
evaluations. IUE involved blatant discrimination by the employer, while most forms of discrimination are subtle and more
difficult to prove. It is important to note the Third Circuit's decision did not directly concern the use of a bona fide evaluation
system which may have a discriminatory effect, but only speaks
to an evaluation system discriminatorily implemented.
One can only speculate whether the Third and Ninth Cir201. Despite the discriminatory effect of some job evaluations, detailed evaluation
methods may lead to fairer wage determination. Several professional consulting firms
have experimented with nondiscriminatory wage programs for willing employers. See,
e.g., COMPENSATION INSTITUTE, COMPARABLE WORTH ANALYSIS QUESTIONAIRE (1980).
202. 631 F.2d at 1097.
203. ld. See notes 178-180 supra and accompanying text.
204.ld.
205. 623 F.2d at 1320.
206. 631 F.2d at 1096.
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cuits will be willing to extend their decisions to include situations in which the employer's job evaluation method, though objectively sound, discriminates against women in application.207
Where wages are set through the use of factor comparisons, for
example, the factors themselves may be rated in a discriminatory fashion. Clerical skills may be given lower point values than
physical skills, resulting in wage differentials. Facially, the evaluation method is objective because factors are applied uniformly
to all jobs, but the factors themselves are discriminatory. While
this hypothetical situation would constitute a "disparate impact" type of violation of Title VII if proved, it could not be
proved without an initial comparable worth analysis of the jobs
in question.
A more difficult problem of proof, following the GuntherJUE model, occurs when the employer can show it acted in good

faith, but its evaluation methods have a disparate impact nonetheless. For example, in Christensen208 and Lemons,209 the employers used bona fide evaluation systems for classifying jobs,
but actual wages were determined according to the local job
market. The employers' wages merely reflected the discriminatory practices in the community. This type of fact situation
presented several difficulties for the courts. Not only were they
asked to find a violation of Title VII when the employer had not
directly instituted discriminatory practices, they were also asked
to force the employer to engage in detailed job comparisons and
suffer possible economic loss by setting wages in disregard of local supply and demand. Neither court felt it could implement
these demands. Were a court willing, however, proof would have
207. In a situation in which the employer used a point/factor method of job evaluation, for example, and factors associated with women's work were assigned less weight
than other factors, the court would have to make a determination that certain factors
should carry the same weight, i.e., that they are of comparable worth. Support for this
contention might be found in production records, profit charts, or independent studies.
One commentator suggests that the plaintiff should only have to show the existence of
job segregation and differing pay to establish a prima facie claim of wage discrimination.
The burden would then fall on the employer to prove the wages were not lower because
the job in question was a woman's job. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 462 (1979).
For an argument against this approach, see Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the 'Comparable Worth' Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233, 279
(1980).
208. 563 F.2d 353.
209. 620 F.2d 228.
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to be twofold. The plaintiff would have to first prove wages in
the local job market were discriminatory (necessitating proof of
comparability), and then prove the employer discriminated by
applying the community standard to its own establishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation on the
basis of sex. While Title VII may reiterate certain protections
offered by the Equal Pay Act, it provides an independent basis
for a claim of wage discrimination. Title VII offers protection to
women underpaid, either because of job segregation or an employer's undervaluation of women's work; there is nothing in the
statute that prevents a claim of discrimination based on unequal
pay for comparable worth. Barriers to judicial acceptance of
such a claim, however, lie beyond the realm of statutory
construction.
While the Ninth and Third Circuits have cautiously widened the scope of a wage discrimination claim, no court has allowed a mere showing of comparable worth of jobs as sufficient
proof of a Title VII violation. Because unequal pay for comparable worth is not a per se violation of Title VII, it must be predicated on some specific, articulable discriminatory practice or effect. It seems unlikely courts will extend Gunther to recognize a
Title VII claim based merely on a showing that the plaintiff was
denied equal pay for work of comparable worth to the employer.
Judicial reluctance to accept or develop this theory partially
results from pressure from the business sector. 210 When courts
scrutinize the laws of supply and demand for "fairness," they
are accused of interfering with the economic structure; when
they consider requiring employers to reassess the job worth and
to set wages accordingly, they are accused of usurping the right
210. The market method can provide a cover for businesses which seek to avoid
complex evaluation systems. Vice-President of Employee Compensation at Bank of
America, John Turney, favors use of the market method, in conjunction with a classification system, to more detailed systems. He stated that evaluation systems such as point
factor merely "clutter up" the basic practice of setting wages at a level competitive with
those in the community market. Because systematic evaluation methods are often the
only documentation of discriminatory practices, an employer is better off using the illusive, changing scale of the market place. Conversation with John Turney, Vice President,
Employee Compensation, Bank of America, San Francisco (Nov. 17, 1980).
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of the employer to engage in free enterprise.211 Nevertheless, despite strong resistance from business interests, the courts frequently engage in such interference to insure equal protection
and fairness in other business-related areas. An undue solicitude
prevents it here.
While the courts need a firm directive from Congress before
they are likely to hold against the alleged business interests,
plaintiffs may be able to strengthen the theory of comparable
worth through litigation.. Although individual litigation appears
to benefit only the plaintiff with compensation for lost wages,
litigation has a strong impact on the employer. Employers who
anticipate adverse judgments may be compelled to re-evaluate
their own practices and exchange them for methods that compensate women employees for the actual value of their work.212
211. See A Business Group Fights "Comparable Worth," Bus. WEEK, Nov. 10, 1980,
at 100, which discusses the rise of business groups such as the Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC), that concentrates on filing amicus curiae briefs in Title VII cases,
and whose board of directors includes officials of General Electric, Exxon, Sears, General
Motors, and Prudential Insurance. The latest EEAC cause is the fight against comparable worth. Malcolm Lovell, a board member of the EEAC, states the organization's goal:
"We have to tackle comparable worth before a law is passed. It could come down to
whether a group of bureaucrats or the market is going to determine wages." [d. at 105,
col. 2.

212. As this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed Gunther, 5-4. 49
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981) (per Brennan, J.j Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens and
White, J.J. joining in the 9pinion. Rehnquist, J., med a dissent, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Powell and Stewart, J.J.). The Court determined that the legislative history of the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII, as well as the policy and language of the employment discrinlination provisions of the Civil Rights Act, supported the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. The
Court sidestepped the issue of comparable worth, however, by narrowly framing the issue
as "whether respondents' failure to satisfy the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act
in itself precludes their proceeding under Title VII." [d. at 4625.
The Court concluded that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporates the Equal
Pay Act defenses into Title VII and that any other interpretation would "insulate • • •
blatantly discriminatory practices from judicial redress under Title VII." [d. at 4628. It
did not, however, decide the "precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination
in comp.ensation under Title VII." [d. at 4629.
The dissent followed the reasoning of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, found fault
with the majority's reliance on policy instead of strict rules of construction, and concluded that the Equal Pay Act governs all compensation discrimination suits.
While the majority opinion provides little guidance for the Title VII plaintiff, and
despite the Court's refusal to directly address the issue of comparable worth, the decision is important to women. The Court has opened t~e way for the use-however limited~f job comparisons in wage discrimination suits.
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